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Emotion Representation and Perception Across Cultures
Abstract
Are emotion words or emotion categories universal, or are particular emotions and
emotion categories specific to certain cultures? The current review explores the
answer to this question by summarizing the limited number of studies that have
addressed this issue. The representation of emotion is discussed with regards to
verbal and nonverbal (facial) processing, in turn. The evidence indicates that the
answer is often conflicting and that issues such as methodological, linguistic, social
and cultural variance have contributed to the often contradictory findings.
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0
License.

This article is available in Online Readings in Psychology and Culture: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/orpc/vol4/iss1/4

Altarriba et al.: Emotion Representation and Perception Across Cultures

INTRODUCTION
The importance of understanding the representation and processing of emotion words and
concepts cannot be underestimated. It is commonly known that the ability to recognize
emotions in oneself and those of others leads to a greater degree of positive mental health
and well-being (see e.g., Altarriba & Morier, 2004). However, there appears to be a dearth
of literature concerning the ways in which emotion word concepts are represented in the
cognitive framework that is memory. Further still, there is a need to expand upon the
known research concerning the identification of emotion in others vis a vis facial
expressions and facial displays. Cross-culturally, it is known that words that label emotions
are often language-specific, that is, they are difficult to translate into a single word or a
group of words in another distinct language (Altarriba, 2003). Therefore, there is an
inherent challenge in trying to discover whether or not the representation of emotions can
be qualified as "universal". The work reviewed here presents a critical analysis of the
extant literature that directly relates to the above questions in both the verbal (word) and
nonverbal (facial) domains.
The Representation of Emotion Concepts in Memory
One of the major models of emotion in the English language is the Circumplex Model of
Affect proposed by Russell (1980). The Circumplex Model of Affect is a spatial model
based on dimensions of affect that are interrelated in a very methodical fashion (Russell,
1980). Affective concepts fall in a circle in the following order: pleasure (0o), excitement
(45o), arousal (90o), distress (135o), displeasure (180o), depression (225o), sleepiness
(270o), and relaxation (315o) (see Figure 1). According to this model, there are two
components of affect that exist: (1) pleasure-displeasure, the horizontal dimension of the
model, and (2) arousal-sleep, the vertical dimension of the model. Therefore, it seems that
any affect word can be defined in terms of its pleasure and arousal components. The
remaining four variables mentioned above do not act as dimensions, but rather help to
define the quadrants of the affective space.
In an attempt to study the pan-cultural aspects of the conceptualization of emotion,
Russell (1983) compared the circular ordering for English emotion words to that of four
other languages–Croatian, Gujarati, Chinese (Cantonese), and Japanese. Each
participant was given a deck of 28 cards, with one emotion term on each card. Each
participant was asked to sort the cards into 4, 7, 10, and 13 groups on successive trials,
with more similar emotional states grouped together. Results revealed that a similar
structure emerged for each language. The emotion terms fell into a circular order among
the two dimensions of pleasure-displeasure and arousal-sleep. Although individual words
varied somewhat in their circular ordering and position space, they never varied enough to
obscure the overall configuration.
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Figure 1. The circumplex model of affect (Russell, 1980).

The results of Russell's study (1983) suggest that emotion words are organized in a similar
pattern across cultures. However, a few objections can be raised. First, it is possible that
the particular sample of English words on which the study is based may be responsible for
the emergence of the two major dimensions, pleasure-displeasure and arousal-sleep. In
other words, by including the terms "happy" and "miserable" the pleasantness dimension
was assured. Also, by including the terms "aroused" and "sleepy", arousal was assured.
The second objection suggests that the process of translation was responsible for the
same structure emerging in all five languages. It is possible that the translation was carried
out in such a manner that the English meaning and structure of the word was still
preserved. Both of these arguments involve the particular set of words that were studied.
Along a similar cross-cultural vein, Brandt and Boucher (1986) examined the
concepts of depression in the emotion lexicons of eight cultures, Australia, Indonesia,
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Puerto Rico, Sri Lanka, and the United States. The data for their
research was part of a larger research project on the native organization of "everyday"
language of emotion in eight cultural groups. Respondents in each culture were asked to
https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/orpc/vol4/iss1/4
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list all of the words that they could think of which indicated emotion and completed the
frame "I feel... ," or "I am..." All of the words were verified by a group of judges as
acceptable members of the emotion lexicon and represented true feelings such as "happy"
or "anger", but not "smile" or "smart". Another independent sample of participants from
each culture were asked to sort the emotion terms into categories that made sense to
them. No restrictions were placed on the number of groups or number of words per group
that could be formed. A cluster analysis was completed and at this point cluster labels,
according to meaning, were formed. Fluent bilinguals translated the emotion labels and
terms. Half of the bilingual's first language was English and for the remaining half their first
language was the native language being studied.
Results indicated that groups of words that met the criterion for a depression cluster
were apparent in four of the eight culture language groups – Indonesia, Japan, Sri Lanka,
and the United States. The emotion lexicons of the four remaining groups that did not
reveal a depression cluster did contain depression-type words. Many of these depressiontype words formed part of the cluster labeled "sadness" in each of the four groups. Brandt
and Boucher (1986) indicated that these four cultures, Australia, Korea, Puerto Rico, and
Malaysia, organize their lexicons around the affective concept of sadness which subsumes
depression, suggesting that depression is a less salient organizational construct for these
four groups.
Brandt and Boucher (1986) stated that the two pan-cultural depression results were:
(a) no association with positive affect, and (b) an intimate association with sadness.
Although every culture did not reveal a depression cluster, depression, as expressed
in the emotion words, was associated with sadness and seems to be apparent across all
of the cultures studied. It seems logical to suggest that depression or an emotion similar to
depression might be considered universal. Culture and social restraints and influences
may cause this emotion to be expressed somewhat differently across cultures, but it is still
linked to sadness and reflects a negative affect across all of the cultures studied.
Hupka, Lenton, and Hutchison (1999) sought to claim that human universals are
present for emotion words and emotion lexicons. They stated that universals have been
demonstrated in natural language in semantics, phonology, grammar, and so on. Hupka et
al. did not have access to native speakers of the languages that were used in the study so
they used dictionaries. It is important to note that some researchers question the use of
dictionaries because they believe the emotion words in different languages are rarely
equivalent. Moreover, they claim that emotion words are not simply labels for universal,
internal feeling states, but are more a reflection of social relations and interactions. Despite
these claims, Hupka et al. believe that these assertions should not be cited as evidence
that there are no universal categories of emotions and that the use of dictionaries falsely
assumes translation equivalence.
Hupka et al. (1999) attempted to establish whether the naming of emotion categories
evolved in a similar sequence across languages and to determine what may have been
the motivation for the naming of the initial stages. The researchers used foreign
dictionaries to establish whether an English emotion category had an equivalent term in
the other languages. They then rank ordered the emotion categories (25 emotion
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
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categories were used) from those that were present in all languages to those that were
infrequent across the languages. A probability sample of 60 major geographical and
linguistic groupings of the world's languages was used.
Results indicated that the naming of emotion categories was relatively consistent
across the languages when English terms were used as the referents. One third of the
sample of languages had terms for all 25 of the emotion categories. Of the remaining
languages, all had terms for at least 15 of the emotion categories. These results suggest
that the emotion lexicon is quite similar across many different languages. These results
tend to support the universality of emotion words across cultures.
Frijda, Markam, Sato, and Wiers (1995) also stated that there exists a high degree of
similarity in the emotion concepts of different languages. In fact, a rather small set of
emotion categories accounts for the most frequently mentioned emotion words in many
different languages. Groups of subjects in 11 different cultures (Belgium, France,
Switzerland, Italy, Netherlands, England, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Surinam, and Turkey)
were asked to name as many emotion words as they could in five minutes. The
researchers then created a table of the 12 most frequently mentioned words for each of
the 11 groups.
An unspecified positive emotion, "joy" or "happiness" equivalents in English,
occurred in 10 of the 11 groups. An unspecified negative emotion, the equivalent of
"sadness" in English, occurred in all of the 11 groups, as well as, an emotional equivalent
to the word "anger", an emotion of negative personal reaction. An emotional response to
threat, "fear", and an emotion of strong affection, "love", occurred in 10 of the 11 cultures.
These five categories, joy/happiness, sadness, fear, anger, and love appear to be quite
general or universal. However, the other emotion words, such as a "hate" equivalent in
English, are less common across many cultures. It is important to mention that this could
be an underestimation because emotion words across cultures may not have an exact
equivalent across other cultures.
Russell (1991) suggests the other possibility that different languages recognize
different emotions because emotion words in other languages do not exist in the English
language. For example, the word "ijirashi" in Japanese refers to a feeling associated with
seeing someone praiseworthy overcoming an obstacle. There is no English equivalent for
this emotion word. There are also English emotion words that are missing altogether in
other languages. The emotion word "anxiety" does not exist among the Eskimos and
Yorubas. In addition, there is no translation equivalent for the word "anxiety" in Chinese.
There is also the claim that there is no word for "depression" among many non-Western
cultural groups. However, the study conducted by Brandt and Boucher (1986) suggests
otherwise. Depression-type words were a part of each culture studied, in both Western
and non-Western cultures. It is also important to note that much of the research concerned
with cross-cultural similarities and differences in emotion lexicons focuses on single words,
such as "love" and "sadness". Although there may not be a one word equivalent across
cultures it is possible that languages can express emotions and ideas other than those that
are coded in single words.
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Russell (1991) stated that it is quite difficult to obtain information on the prevalence
of the differences among emotion words in different cultures because counting the number
of emotion words is difficult and ethnographers tend to report differences more than
similarities. Russell suggests that similarities may be taken for granted and mentioned in
passing, often to contrast with differences.
Russell (1991) cited evidence that the concept of emotion may in fact be universal,
as described in the study conducted by Brandt and Boucher (1986). Russell reviewed
many studies and stated that regardless of the culture studied, the same three dimensions
of pleasure, arousal, and dominance were used to make emotion judgments. Some
studies revealed that arousal and pleasure were the two dominant dimensions, while
others suggested that pleasure and dominance were the two most important dimensions.
Russell suggested that the reason that arousal emerged in some studies and dominance
in others could be due to the words used in the studies. Dominance-submissiveness may
have emerged as the second dimension when the sample of words emphasized
interpersonal contexts and arousal-sleepiness may have emerged as the second
dimension when the sample words emphasized non-interpersonal contexts.
A major focus of cross-cultural research has been basic emotion theory. This theory
states that basic emotions are supposed to be part of the human potential and therefore
universal (Mesquita, Frijda, & Scherer, 1997). Mesquita et al. stated that most languages
possess limited sets of emotion-labeling words that refer to a small number of commonly
occurring emotions, such as sadness, joy, anger, and fear. The "basic" emotions generally
include "anger", "fear", "happiness", "sadness", and "disgust" (Russell, 1991). Mesquita et
al. pointed out that researchers have had great success translating English terms for
emotions into many other languages. Further, research has revealed that basic emotion
categories, with lexical equivalents in all languages, are also the most frequently used
emotion words in most cultures.
However, Mesquita et al. (1997) also pointed out that there are differences in the
connotations and meanings of emotion terms across languages. The term "lexical
equivalents" is not the same as "linguistic equivalents". In other words, although words
may be translated across languages their meanings may not be the same or even similar
across cultures. The research reviewed thus far has not painted a clear picture about the
universality of emotion words across cultures. Some research has suggested that emotion
words, particularly the basic emotions are universal; however, that notion has not gone
uncontested. The fact that translation equivalents are present does not guarantee that the
meaning or use of the word is the same. This seems to beg the question, "Why do emotion
lexicons vary across cultures?"
It has been suggested that emotion lexicons may differ across cultures because of
cultural regulations and the relationship between a person and others (Semin, Gorts,
Nandram, & Semin-Goossens, 2002). It is believed that such cultural variations may reflect
how emotions and emotion events are represented in language. Semin et al. (2002)
studied cultural variations in the representation of emotions by investigating how people in
different cultures talked about emotions and emotional events. It is believed that
differences in emotion terms and events may reflect the social differences across cultures.
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
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In cultures that value individualism, emotion terms are more likely to be individual or
self-markers because individual preferences and goals prevail over group goals, thoughts,
and feelings. In contrast, in a socio-centered culture, emotion terms would be more
prominent as relationship-markers because the thoughts, feelings, and goals of the group
are valued more highly than those of the individual. Semin et al. suggested that one way of
determining whether emotions are used as self-markers or relationship-markers is by
means of the relative frequency of different grammatical categories, such as verbs and
nouns, which are spontaneously mentioned.
Semin et al. (2002) used the Linguistic Category Model or LCM (Semin & Fiedler,
1988) as a framework to examine the relative prominence of different emotion terms and
the linguistic characteristics of emotion event descriptions. The researchers hypothesized
that in cultures where group goals are predominant, the use of concrete language, mostly
interpersonal verbs, would be more accessible than abstract language, such as adjectives
and nouns, because concrete language marks relationships. However, in cultures where
individualism is emphasized it was expected that abstract language would be more
accessible.
In the first study, Semin et al. (2002) focused on the relative prominence of different
linguistic categories in the spontaneous listing of emotion terms, as well as examining
whether the causes of emotional events were perceived to be individual or interpersonal,
and the degree to which significant others were perceived to shape emotion events.
Hindustani-Surinamese (group-focused culture) and Dutch (individually-focused culture)
participants were given four tasks: (a) an emotion term generation task, (b) generate five
examples of critical life events or five critical emotions that one might experience, (c)
generate emotions that are likely to occur in those critical life events or the types of
situations that gave rise to the critical emotions, and (d) judge the relative contribution that
others made to shape the events they had listed. All subjects were also given a 17-item
independence-interdependence
scale
with
three
sub-dimensions,
traditional
interdependence, independence-dependence, and family interdependence.
The results of the emotion generation task were analyzed and revealed that the
Dutch participants listed significantly more emotions than did the Hindustani-Surinamese
participants. It was also found that the Hindustani-Surinamese used more state verbs and
fewer state referent nouns than the Dutch. Also, the Hindustani-Surinamese participants
mentioned significantly more interpersonal events than did the Dutch and significant others
had a stronger influence on the Hindustani-Surinamese participants. These results
supported the hypothesis suggesting that emotional events and emotion lexicons may vary
due to social differences across cultures.
The second study conducted by Semin et al. (2002) addressed the structure of
emotion events by examining the overall pattern of predicate use as a function of cultural
background. Again, the researchers expected that the language used to represent emotion
events would be more abstract in cultures where individual goals prevail over group goals
and concrete language would be used more often in cultures that value group goals over
individual goals. Dutch and Turkish participants were asked to complete a questionnaire
that consisted of two parts: (a) an event-description task and (b) an emotion-description
https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/orpc/vol4/iss1/4
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task. The Dutch participants represented an individualistic culture and the Turkish
participants represented the collectivist culture.
The results once again supported the prediction. The Dutch participants used more
abstract language to represent emotions and emotion events, while the Turkish
participants used more concrete language for the same tasks. These two studies revealed
that individualistic cultures and collectivist cultures represent emotions and emotional
events using different linguistic markers and levels of abstraction. It seems logical to
suggest that culture affects one's emotional lexicon. However, it would be interesting to
see if the emotion words reported by the different cultures were in fact the same or at least
had a similar meaning for the different contexts studied. These differences were either not
studied or not reported in the current study.
A study that compared the similarity of the words generated may be more telling of
the cross-cultural similarity of the emotion lexicon across cultures. However, the study
conducted by Semin et al. (2002) provides a possible explanation for the differences found
in the emotion lexicons across cultures. Studying emotions across cultures has proven to
be a difficult task. It seems some want to argue that there must be exact translation
equivalents for each and every emotion word, while others believe that the universality of
basic emotion categories provides evidence that there is cross-cultural similarity of
emotions. Emotion research is often plagued by the lack of a commonly accepted
definition of the word "emotion". This problem makes it even more difficult to study emotion
across cultures and to accept a distinct position on the results of such research.
The Processing of Facial Expressions Across Cultures
An additional method often used to determine how one's culture influences emotional
development and perception is facial expression recognition. This area of cross-cultural
research has seen a steady increase in interest ever since Darwin's, The Expression of
Emotion in Man and Animals was first published in 1872. This work emphasized that facial
expressions were primarily a result of genetic and hereditary factors. Meanwhile, other
research has indicated that one's environment plays a more influential role in determining
how emotion is expressed. For example, Piderit (1925, cited in Izard, 1980) suggested that
environmental factors were more influential, a conclusion he came to by observing that the
amount of expression elicited by blind people was positively correlated with the length of
time that each individual had sight prior to their current condition. Therefore, it is apparent
that the main question arising from these two pieces of very early work is whether genetic
or environmental factors are more responsible for the way that emotion is visually
expressed. Cross-cultural research aimed at examining the way different cultures
categorize or recognize certain facial expressions has been able to shed some light on this
rather controversial issue.
By the early 1970's, research conducted on the way in which facial expressions were
categorized across cultures indicated that eight different emotions – interest-excitement,
joy, surprise, distress-anguish, disgust-contempt, anger, shame, and fear were perceived
the same way in American, European, South American and Asian cultures (Dickey &
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

9

Online Readings in Psychology and Culture, Unit 4, Subunit 1, Chapter 4

Knower, 1941; Ekman & Friesen, 1972; Izard, 1968). Ekman et al. (1969, as cited in Izard,
1980) expanded this area of research to preliterate cultures. The participants in their study
were from an isolated area of New Guinea, which allowed for very little Western influence.
Extra effort was taken to ensure that those who actually participated in the experiment had
never been exposed to Western society, had never seen television or magazines, and had
never worked for a Caucasian person. Whereas previous experiments required
participants to label or categorize emotions observed in photographs, the methodology
employed in this study was slightly different. Ekman et al. (1969, as cited in Izard, 1980)
presented participants with three different pictures of emotion expressions representing
either happiness, sadness, disgust, surprise, anger or fear. The experimenters verbally
described a story that depicted one of the emotions in the pictures, to which participants
determined which emotion was being described. The results indicated that significantly
correct responses were obtained for all of the pictures, except for instances when fear and
surprise were presented in the same trial. However, when compared with other emotions,
correct responses to fear and surprise were observed. Therefore, the apparent universality
of these six emotions provides support for the idea of an innate emotion perceptual ability
in humans.
Following Ekman's (1972, cited in Izard, 1980) review of research on facial
expression judgment, Fridlund, Ekman and Oster's (1987) literature review analyzed more
recent work conducted on the topic. This review, incorporating fifteen years of additional
research, supported the previous conclusion that there is universality among six basic
emotions – happiness, surprise, fear, sadness, anger and disgust.
Although data gathered over several decades proved to be fairly consistent for these
six emotions, research from the past decade has been useful in narrowing down specific
cultural and methodological factors that appear to influence participant's responses.
Schimmack (1996) was able to determine which factors are most influential by analyzing
data from various studies in a stepwise regression analysis. The purpose of this study was
to examine why Ekman's data revealed better accuracy for the recognition of surprise and
sadness when compared to Izard's participants. In addition, a second trend in Ekman's
research indicated that disgust was more poorly recognized than it was in Izard's work.
Schimmack (1996) was also concerned with why Caucasian participants tended to
recognize emotions more accurately than other races. Lastly, the amount of influence
elicited by cultural dimensions of uncertainty avoidance (UAI) and individualism (IDV) were
analyzed. The individualism factor (IDV) was hypothesized to influence accuracy scores in
that individualistic cultures tend to be more receptive to negative emotions than do
collectivistic cultures. The dimension of uncertainty avoidance (UAI) predicts that
individuals raised in cultures that are high in this type of avoidance will not feel as
comfortable in new or uncertain situations and therefore tend to avoid any type of situation
that has potential to elicit fear. This naturally leads to the hypothesis that UAI will affect
facial expression perception by decreasing one's ability to recognize fear expressions
since they have been infrequently observed.
The regression analysis carried out consisted of 23 samples from 17 countries.
Initially, Schimmack (1996) determined whether each culture should be classified as
https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/orpc/vol4/iss1/4
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Caucasian or non-Caucasian. This was done using the definition of Caucasian presented
in the Encyclopedia Britannica. However, it is mentioned that this type of classification may
be problematic in that some countries are composed of many ethnic groups. For example,
the United States consists of not only Caucasian people, but of significant numbers of
African Americans, Asians, and Latinos.
The results from this analysis indicated that discrepancies in Ekman and Izard's data
may be due to the number of emotions that were included in each trial. For example,
participants in Izard's studies were less accurate at recognizing surprise and sadness
when additional options such as interest and shame were also included. As would be
expected, larger set size led to increased confusion among emotion categories, which
resulted in poorer recognition. In a similar vein, it was observed that Ekman's data
produced lower accuracy for the recognition of disgust whenever contempt was presented
as well. This further supports the idea that set size is an influential factor in facial
recognition tasks (Schimmack, 1996).
With regards to ethnic variables influencing expression recognition accuracy, the
results indicated that Caucasians produce more accurate responses when recognizing
happiness, fear, anger and disgust, but not when recognizing surprise or sadness. Data
broken down to analyze each specific emotion indicated that happiness had higher
accuracy when judged by individualistic cultures. As predicted, fear appeared to be
significantly affected by UAI. Lastly, emotions of anger and disgust were most influenced
by the ethnic variable, with Caucasians being more accurate than non-Caucasians.
Overall, the author was able to determine that the Caucasian factor, type of study and UAI
were responsible for more than 70% of the variation observed across all studies. This
analysis allows for a better understanding of how specific factors are capable of
influencing the results of cross-cultural studies conducted on facial expression recognition.
With regards to methodology, additional implications resulting from this research suggest
that set size (the number of categories presented to participants on each trial) should be
considered more carefully in future work.
More recent research conducted on facial expression perception has been
specifically aimed at examining how genetic factors influence recognition accuracy. In a
study conducted by Teitelbaum and Geiselman (1997) participants representing either
African American, White, Latino, or Asian ethnic groups were randomly assigned a packet
containing two written passages, one designed to induce a positive mood on the individual
and a second that would serve to induce an unpleasant mood. Half of the participants
read the pleasant mood passage first, while the other half read the unpleasant one first.
Each passage contained blank areas throughout the story, allowing participants to fill in
words that corresponded with their thoughts and mood at the time. The experimenter also
questioned individuals after they read each passage to ensure that they were accurately
receptive to the mood inducing passage. Participants were shown 20 pictures of African
American and White faces (10 photographs for each mood). In addition, equal numbers of
each race were depicted in the pictures (Teitelbaum & Geiselman, 1997).
During the testing portion of the experiment, participants were shown 20 pictures.
However, this time half of the photographs were new and half were old. Individuals had to
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
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decide if the face presented was previously seen or not. The results indicated a cross-race
recognition effect in that African American and White participants had higher accuracy
ratings for faces corresponding with their own race than with those pictures that did not.
With regards to Latinos and Asians, it was observed that they were capable of recognizing
White faces as well as White participants; however, they showed more difficulty than
African American participants when recognizing African American faces. Lastly, the data
revealed that participants had higher accuracy ratings when they experienced an
unpleasant mood than when they were in a pleasant mood (Teitelbaum & Geiselman,
1997).
Although this experiment mainly focused on face recognition and did not directly
explore the way that facial expressions are interpreted, the data presented prove to be
helpful by once again showing how certain methodological factors can influence the
outcome of a study. Since it appears that certain races are better adapted to recognizing
faces from their own culture, it will be important for cross-cultural researchers exploring
facial expressions to include a variety of ethnic faces in their experimental materials so
that participants will not produce results that are heavily affected by cultural bias. This
study also reveals that a person's mood may affect their perception of faces. Therefore, it
may be helpful for experimenters looking at facial expression recognition to question and
document the mood of each individual participant prior to data collection. This may provide
additional insight into why some individuals are more sensitive to certain expressions, as
well as revealing if some cultures are more or less affected by their mood at the time of
study.
In an effort to create a good set of pictures expressing emotion, Wang and Markham
(1999) examined how Chinese participants rated facial expressions produced by Chinese
people in previously taken photographs. In line with previously discussed studies, these
authors chose to analyze the six basic emotions – happiness, sadness, anger, fear,
surprise and disgust, that appear to be universal across cultures. Adding support to a
common trend observed in other studies, their results indicated that happiness and
sadness produced the strongest and most consistent agreement of the six emotions. The
emotion of anger was also determined to have very high agreement and consistency.
However, it was occasionally mistaken for disgust in a few cases. The results also showed
that fear and surprise were commonly confused; however, the authors did add that posers
often experienced difficulty when trying to create an expression that accurately depicted
fear. Finally, the emotion of disgust proved to have the worst percentage agreement of the
six emotions. The authors suggest that not only is disgust difficult to pose for, but it is also
difficult to recognize, an observation that extends back to some of the earlier work on facial
expression recognition.
Although the results from Wang and Markham's (1999) work appear to support much
of the previous work conducted on facial expression, in order to gain a better
understanding of emotion recognition in other cultures, it would be interesting to present
the photograph set selected to be the most valid in this study to people of different ethnic
backgrounds. In addition, if one wants to form a stronger conclusion on how Chinese
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people perceive facial expressions, it is essential to replicate this study using not only
Chinese faces, but those of White, Black and Latino individuals as well.
In a very recent study, Matsumoto et al. (2002) examined the way that American and
Japanese participants judged facial expressions. This experiment was unique in that it is
the first experiment designed to test how facial expressions of varying intensities are
perceived in two different cultures. American and Japanese participants were presented
with computer generated pictures of Japanese and Caucasian faces depicting one of nine
emotion choices – anger, contempt, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, surprise, no
emotion, and other. Upon viewing each picture, individuals were instructed to determine
which emotion best described the picture, to rate the intensity of the emotion expressed
using a nine point scale, and to rate the intensity level that they believed the poser was
experiencing in the picture. If the participant decided that "other" best represented the
picture, they were urged to write down the emotion that they felt accurately described the
expression presented.
The results indicated that low intensity expressions were correctly recognized at
levels above chance and that these expressions also differed from the responses given for
neutral expressions. Therefore, it appears that individuals are capable of correctly
recognizing emotions even when they are presented at lesser degrees and may not be as
blatantly obvious. However, when compared to high intensity expressions, it was evident
that agreement levels for low intensity expressions were more inconsistent. In regards to
differences across cultures, further analysis revealed that the two groups did not differ in
the way that they categorized the facial expressions. However, analyses of the ratings
produced by participants at high intensity levels of expressions indicated that Americans
rated internal experience as lower than external displays, while Japanese participants did
not show any differences in the ratings at this level. Interestingly, at low intensity levels of
expression, Americans did not show any differences in their ratings, but Japanese
participants tended to give higher ratings to internal experience than to external
observation. This suggests that when Japanese view facial expressions at low intensities,
they tend to think that the poser is experiencing a more intense feeling of the emotion than
is actually portrayed. On the other hand, when Americans view high intensity expressions,
it is thought that they perceive emotions as being portrayed in an exaggerated way and
therefore are inclined to think that the poser does not feel the emotion as intensely as the
facial expressions suggests (Matsumoto et al., 2002).
The fact that this study is the first of its kind to examine intensity levels suggests that
there are many factors that can be manipulated in future work on facial expression across
cultures. Intuitive experiments designed to examine some of these factors are necessary
to increase understanding of specific aspects of certain cultures that might otherwise be
left unexplained. Therefore, it is important that this study be replicated with other cultures,
especially since the sample size was relatively small in the current study, a factor that may
have affected the results. However, it is apparent that the methodology utilized here will
serve as a stepping-stone for future work
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Conclusions
In conclusion, several decades of cross-cultural research appear to suggest that there is
an element of universality in regards to some of the basic fundamental human emotions.
However, in addition to some of the methodological issues of concern already discussed,
there are several other problems that may influence cross-cultural research in this domain.
Russell (1991) brings up a very important point in that studies requiring participants to
choose an emotion label from a prespecified list that best corresponds with a presented
picture may result in an inability to show "precise equivalence of the emotion concepts in
the different cultures" (Russell, 1991, p. 435). For example, Russell (1991) proposes that if
a participant is shown a picture of a smiling person, they would be inclined to choose the
word happy from a list of sad, happy, afraid or angry. However, if the word happy was
replaced by the word elated, the participant would now choose this word being that it is the
only word in the list with positive connotation. He points out that any positive word ranging
fromcontent to ecstatic would result in a similar response. Basically this means that forcedchoice tasks may require a person to make a judgment that is not culturally sensitive to the
actual meaning of the emotion being examined. Therefore, it is suggested that this
problem may be potentially responsible for cross-cultural research showing that people
from different cultures interpret facial expressions in a similar manner. This response
biasness often arises because cross-cultural studies of this nature involve creating a list of
emotion words in English that are then translated into the specific language used by the
culture being studied. For this reason, it is quite possible that the translated emotion word
choices in the other language are not good representatives of the emotions that one
wishes to examine.
In addition to this language problem, there are also other cultural differences that
may influence the data that are produced by facial recognition studies. For example, not all
facial expressions are the same in every culture. Although common emotions are
expressed, it is possible that some of these emotions are expressed in different ways,
using different hand gestures and facial movements. Lastly, a longtime concern in crosscultural research that must be addressed in these types of experiments as well is the
testing situation employed by experimenters. If two cultures are to be examined and
compared, it is essential that similar testing situations be used and proficient translators be
employed to present experimental tasks in an unbiased way.
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Questions for Discussion
1. What are the two major dimensions of Russell's Circumplex model of affect? Why
might arousal constitute one dimension instead of dominance?
2. Do you believe that the presence of depression-type words, but no depression cluster,
is convincing evidence for the universality of depression?
3. Is it reasonable to study single words across cultures to determine the universality of
emotions or might phrases and ideas be more appropriate?
4. Distinguish between "lexical equivalents" and "linguistic equivalent".
5. How might culture and socialization influence a culture's emotion lexicon?
6. What do you believe was the most convincing evidence for the universality of emotion
across cultures? What was the most convincing evidence for the non-universality of
emotions across cultures?
7. Can you think of any facial expressions or gestures used to signify emotion that are
specific to one culture and are not universal?
8. Can you think of any reasons why Schimmack's (1996) data indicated that Caucasians
produce more accurate responses when recognizing happiness, fear, anger and
disgust, but not when recognizing surprise or sadness? Are there specific
characteristics of Caucasian society that would be responsible for this result?
9. How might specific child-rearing practices in certain cultures influence one's emotional
development and the way that they express emotion?
10. We have already seen how cultural variables (individualism vs. collectivism,
uncertainty avoidance, etc.), genetic factors and methodological issues (set size of
emotions presented, number of participants, and testing situation) can be important
factors in influencing data. What additional methodological factors do you think should
be regulated when designing an experiment within this area of study?
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